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SOCIAL BRAIN OR INSTITUTIONS, CULTURAL TOOLS AND 
SOCIAL PRACTICES? 
HOW TO EXPLAIN SCHOOL PROCESSES AND INEQUALITIES?
COMMENTS ON NEIL MERCER’S PAPER
Jean-Yves Rochex
ESCOL-CIRCEFT, université Paris 8 Saint-Denis




I would try here to comment and discuss Neil 
Mercer’s very interesting paper (and two other 
ones he published before: Mercer, 2013; Mercer 
& Howe, 2012) from my point of view and my 
research topics which aim to describe and to explain 
the social and school processses of construction of 
school inequalities by crossing the contribution and 
the questions of different research ields: cultural 
psychology (especially Vygotskian theory), didactics 
and sociology. Of course, I agree with the main 
theoretical propositions which are the core of Neil 
Mercer’s argument (especially the social nature of 
human cognition and its consequences for education 
and teaching-learning processes), but I would try 
to discuss the “social brain hypothesis,” to read 
Vygotski’s works and to distinguish and to develop 
the different meanings ot the word social in our 
research approaches and conceptual frames, in some 
different ways than Neil Mercer does.
IS "SOCIAL BRAIN" A USEFUL CONCEPT OR 
METAPHOR?
Of course, the progress of knowledge about the 
brain’s structures and functions is nowadays very 
fast and impressive, and psychology and educational 
sciences must pay special attention about what 
Dunbar (1998) and other researchers named “social 
brain hypothesis” or “the brain’s prosociality.” This 
hypothesis argues that “human brain is designed 
to enable people to adjust sensitively to one other’s 
perspectives and emotions, so as to enable cooperative 
activity from which a whole community can beneit” 
(Wolpert & Frith, 2004, quoted in Mercer, 2013), 
and that this design was a decisive advantage in the 
evolutionary struggle for survival and expansion of 
human species. Neil Mercer emphasises the interest 
but also the limits and the risks of such a concept 
or hypothesis when he remarks that “theory of 
mind,” and even “mirror responses” are not hard-
wired in human (or primate) brain but are changed 
by experience and developed through practice and 
guidance, and especially when he writes:
“The social brain hypothesis entails a signiicantly 
different conception of human intelligence from 
that which has usually been adopted in mainstream 
psychology. However, there is a danger that this 
perspective merely employs the concept of the 
social brain to generate a new style of individualistic 
explanation for how people are able to negotiate the 
social world, and why some of our individual ancestors 
managed to “survive” in that world better than 
others. That is, it is still associated with an inherently 
individualistic conception of human cognition. Thus 
evolutionary psychologists tend to argue for the value 
of intermental sensitivities for promoting individual 
success in competition and combat (e.g. Harcourt, 
1989, cited in Dunbar)” (Mercer, this issue).
So I agree absolutely with Mercer when he argues, 
about social brain hypothesis, that “its current 
conceptualization is too narrow and individualistic” 
(Mercer, 2013). But I’m not sure that, as he writes, 
“we need to expand the concept of the social brain” 
(this issue), or that “(this) concept should be 
redeined to take account of the distinctive human 
capacity for thinking collectively” (Mercer, 2013), to 
take account of “the ability to more than just interact, 
but rather to ‘interthink’” as “a key characteristic of 
the social brain” (this issue), and that “Vygotskian 
socio-cultural theory offers a framework for this 
reconceptualization” (Mercer, 2013). In other 
words, I doubt that “social brain” is a real concept; 
I think it's rather a metaphor. And I’m afraid using 
this metaphor involves more inconveniences than 
advantages.
I think psychologists and education researchers 
need to be very cautious when they use such a 
metaphor both because (in epistemological register) 
of the risk of reductionism which believe it’s possible 
to see or to ind the secrets and the explication of 
our social behaviours in our brain’s structure and 
modes of functioning, and because of the very 
strong claim by many neuroscientists to be able 
– now or, if not, tomorrow – to predict or to rule 
all psychological or educational processes, even 
to prescribe to teachers how to teach and how to 
deal, no more with children but with their brain. 
A caricatural exemple of such a claim was very 
recently published on the irst page of Science and 
Medicine supplement of the French famoust daily, Le 
Monde: Laurent Alexandre, a surgeon, who presents 
himself as a neuro-revolutionary, argued that, in 
2050, school will no more deal with knowledge 
but with brains, neuroscientists must help teachers 
to became neuro-growers, and teaching must be 
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personnalized according to neurobiological and 
cognitive caracteristics of each pupil; so he concluded 
that it would be necessary henceforth to call on 
a neuroscientist to be the Minister of education 
(Alexandre, 2015).
Of course, most of arguments about the social 
brain are far from such a caricature, but most of their 
authors do share the belief that the concept of social 
brain is useful to understand how we think or we feel. 
I think there is in the social brain hypothesis a danger 
to confuse two different topics: the brain’s structure 
and modes of functioning as condition of possibility 
for our social (and cultural) behaviours, and as an 
explication for these behaviours. Of course the irst 
topic is undeniable and to increase the knowledge 
we have of brain’s structure and functioning is very 
important. But could we think (or hope) it will be 
possible (both from empirical and theoretical point 
of view) to report what we think or feel, and the 
way we do it, to neurobiological structures and 
mecanisms, even if we consider that these structures 
and mecanisms are numerous, diverse and complex? 
What is the sense of the word social in the utterance 
social brain? And, if we consider that neurosciences 
could be social, couldn’t we be dubious about the 
status of a social concept or a social register which 
could be supposed to receive an ultimate explication 
in non-social but biological terms?1
So, what is the main characteristic which 
could explain the huge gap between primate and 
humankind? Is it only an additional degree of brain’s 
complexity, due to evolution? Or is it, according 
to the French social anthropologist André Leroi-
Gourhan, the fact that “from homo sapiens onwards, 
the construction of a social memory equipment 
prevails over all human evolution questions. […] All 
the human evolution converges to put out of human 
individual what, in the other animal species, responds 
to specific adaptation,” so that “social memory 
gradually substitutes for instinct biological devices”2 
(Leroi-Gourhan, 1965). Then, I don’t think that 
“the essentially social quality of human cognition” 
could be represented by the concept of social brain, 
but rather by the switch from biological evolution to 
social history and cultural devices accumulation and 
transmission. If human cognition and sensibility are 
biologically based, they are not biologically shaped 
and explainable; their origins and the processes by 
which they take forms and contents cannot be found 
in the brain, nor in the individual, but in institutions 
and cultural artefacts and practices which organize 
social life for everybody.3 
Although he was very interested in the knowledge 
of brain, Vygotski criticised strongly the solipsism 
of biological or individualistic conceptions of human 
cognition and its development: “To discover the 
source of thought, we need to go out of the organism’s 
boundaries, and to go not in the inner sphere of 
mind, but in the objective forms of social life. The 
origins of human consciousness and liberty must be 
inquired in social history of mankind. To ind the 
soul, we need to lose it”4 (Vygotski, quoted in Luria, 
1966).5 Then, the motor of human development, of 
human cognition and sensiblity is not in the brain 
or in the biological equipment of each individual, 
but in the discrepancy and the contradiction (the 
drama in Politzer’s words) between the limits and 
the incompletion of individuals and the successive 
achievements of institutions6 and works,7 “between 
the developed cultural forms of thinking, acting 
and feeling in which children are involved and 
the primitive forms which characterize their own 
behavior”8 (Vygotski, 1931/2014).
HOW TO THINK THE RESEARCH ON CLASSROOM 
PARADOX?
Maybe Neil Mercer will not disagree with all 
I wrote above, and the questions at stake could be 
more a problem of formulation or of emphasis put 
on some aspects rather than on some other ones. For 
my part, although I’m dubious about this concept 
or metaphor, I do agree with the main theses that 
Mercer draws from his discussion of the social brain 
hypothesis, namely the paramount importance of 
joint intellectual9 activity and collaboration for 
human development and for the human “ability to 
more than just interact, but rather to interthink,” 
the crucial and specific functions of language as 
an institution and as practices and genres both to 
collective thinking and joint activity and to move 
from interpsychological thinking and relationship 
to intrapsychological ones, from other-regulation 
to self-regulation. Mercer and Howe’ remarks that 
working in groups is not suficient to work as a group 
are very useful to prevent us from pedagogical naivety 
and from a lot of current commonplaces which tend 
to persuade us that pupils could learn essentially 
by interaction and discussion between themselves 
SOCIAL BRAIN OR INSTITUTIONS, CULTURAL TOOLS AND SOCIAL PRACTICES?
Jean-Yves Rochex
28
regardless of teacher’s activity and intervention. And 
their descriptions and analyses of many examples of 
implementation of transactive dialogue, reasoned 
discussion, exploratory or accountable talk are very 
suggestive both for teachers and for educational 
researchers; as very convincing is their proposition 
“to give the critical examination of classsroom 
dialogue higher priority in teachers’ initial training 
and professional development” (Mercer & Howe, 
2012). But Mercer and Howe draw our attention on 
the fact that “there can be confusion and uncertainty 
over what precisely joint activity should mean,” and 
“over what precisely classroom dialogue should mean 
or must be” (our addition). Of course, joint activity 
and classroom dialogue depend on the nature of task, 
knowledge or practice involved and on the grade of 
pupils; they vary and must be speciically described 
and analysed – by researchers – and organized – by 
teachers – regarding these aims and context.
Such a work is dificult and, although they review 
different research evidence which show that the 
quality of dialogue and interaction – between pupils 
and between teacher and pupils – in classroom 
improve collaborative learning and the quality of 
educational outcomes, Mercer and Howes note 
nevertheless that “one of the first messages to 
emerge from work surveying classroom activity 
is that truly collaborative activity rarely happens” 
(Mercer & Howe, 2012) or that “research shows 
that Exploratory Talk is quite rare in classroom, in 
comparison with less analytic and less collaborative 
types of interaction” (Mercer, this issue). Then, 
we need to think and analyse the reasons for such 
indings, both in and out of classroom, and I argue 
we need, to do that, to expand the uses we do of 
vygotskian theory beyond the classroom boundaries, 
towards cultural artefacts and tools and towards 
social determination of classroom processes and 
interactions.
Post-piagetian researchers have shown more than 
thirty years ago that sociocognitive conlict may or 
not be beneicial to improve children’ or students’ 
thinking and problem solving.10 The conditions 
of such an improvement are that sociocognitive 
conlict could be cognitively explicited, discussed 
and solved and, to allow this regulation, that other-
regulation could be ruled on cognitive or knowledge 
register (which is, on a large part, impersonnal 
register, ruled by norms which are not dependent 
to individuals and their ordinary interactions, but 
to social external institutions and cultural tools) 
rather than on social one, ruled by social, gender or 
school status (“I’m right because I’m a good pupil, 
or because mathematics are not woman’s element”) 
or by children’ self-esteem (“I don’t know, it’s too 
hard for me. I have never done this before. So you 
could do it better than me”). Mercer’s papers argue 
judiciously that these conditions apply to classroom 
talk or dialogue, and show that they cannot be taken 
for granted:
“Research on classroom-based group work embodies 
a paradox: it has shown the value of collaborative 
learning, but it has also shown that much of the group 
activity which goes on in classroom has little educational 
value. […] Children may not have many opportunities 
to learn how to conduct reasoned discussions in their 
out-of-school lives, or may not realize that they should 
engage in them when given collaborative tasks in the 
classroom. If their teachers do not raise their awareness 
of how they might talk and work together, or provide 
them with models and guidance, they are unlikely to 
develop the relevant skills for collective thinking and 
apply them appropriately. It is not so surprising, then, 
that in peer group discussion, the talk is often off-topic, 
unproductively disputational and inequitable” (Mercer, 
2013).
So, to be relevant to knowledge acquisition and 
to be beneicial to the progress of pupils, peer group 
work and discussion, classroom talk and dialogue, 
must be not only teacher-led, but also teacher-ruled 
and granted regarding not only task or problem 
solving but also knowledge and thinking stakes 
which are theoretically involved in task or problem 
solving. The challenge needs strong professional 
competencies and a constant and acute vigilance 
regarding the nature of tasks and of pupils’ activity 
and exchanges, the vocabulary and genres of 
discourse speciic to subjects and their approaches. 
It needs also that teachers could use ordinary 
these competencies and vigilance whatever the 
social and institutional context of their school, and 
whatever their pupils’ social background or gender. 
Sociological researches about classroom activities 
and discourses show that it happens rarely, and that 
the multimodality of classroom processes, which 
involve simultaneously gestures, material or semiotic 
artefacts and devices, language practices and physical 
settings, could both shape learning processes for 
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some pupils but misunderstandings or wrong ways 
for other ones, sometimes during what is apparently 
the same classroom setting and collective activity.
BERNSTEIN AND VYGOTSKI: TO GIVE TO 
VYGOTSKIAN APPROACH ITS FULL SOCIAL 
DIMENSION
At this point, I think it’s necessary to complete 
vygotskian approach by a sociological one. Or, 
more exactly to develop vygotskian theory to give to 
this approach and theoretical point of view, its full 
sociological dimension. And I will argue here that the 
sociological works and concepts proposed by Basil 
Bernstein, who has read very carefully Vygotski’s 
works, could be very precious to do that.11 Bernstein 
frequently refers to Vygotsky’s work as one of the 
major references upon which he founded his own 
thought, particularly by contrast with Piaget’s theory 
(which he describes as “abstract structuralism”) and 
with all the theories that tend to converge towards 
the “idealism of competence” achieved “at the price 
of abstracting the individual from the analysis of 
distributions of power and principles of control 
which selectively specialise modes of acquisition 
and realisations” (Bernstein, 2000, p. 43). The major 
Vygotskian thesis of a social genesis of thought 
and consciousness through activities carried out 
in common with others certainly relects his own 
theoretical and empirical interests. Yet, for Bernstein, 
the reference to Vygotsky’s theory remains critical. 
According to him, the Russian psychologist was 
unable to infer all of the sociological implications of 
his thesis because of his overly restrictive conception 
of development, which exposed him to the risk of 
linguistic or instrumental determinism:
“Vygotsky appeared to have a restricted view of 
development, essentially cognitive, and a practice which 
appears to privilege the acquisition of the ‘tool’ rather 
than the social context of acquisition [...]. The metaphor 
of ‘tool’ draws attention to a device, an empowering 
device, but there are some reasons to consider that the 
tool with its internal specialized structure is abstracted 
from its social construction” (Bernstein, 1994, p. 17).
The issue here is not merely the need to take 
account, between History and the development of 
individuals, of the speciic histories and different 
or unequal development of the various social 
formations, as Sylvia Scribner has already insisted in 
a critical discussion of Vygotskian theory (Scribner, 
1985), but also the need to take account of the 
inherent heterogeneity, conlictuality and inequalities 
which characterise every social formation, as Ruqaiya 
Hasan insists in writing that “where Vygotsky 
appears to see homogeneity, Bernstein, from the 
very beginning, sees heterogeneity” (Hasan, 2004, 
p. 36). Hasan underlines the complementary nature 
of Vygotsky’s and Bernstein’s approaches, but also 
emphasizes what she sees as the more heuristic and 
more elaborated character of Bernstein’s study of the 
relations between family socialisation and school 
socialisation and between “local” and “official” 
pedagogical modalities, and the possibility of giving 
them their full sociological dimension:
“The school is where the business of learning is 
‘institutionalized’ but, as Vygotsky pointed out, ‘any 
learning the child encounters in school has a previous 
history’ (Vygotsky, Mind in Society, p. 84). Bernstein’s 
message on this issue was more elaborated: he tried 
to show us what previous histories of discursive 
participation different groups of children bring to the 
school and how this history might impinge on learning 
in school given the nature of the official pedagogic 
systems” (Hasan, 2002, p. 547).
Bernstein’s and Hasan’s assumptions invite us 
to study carefully how these previous histories of 
discursive activity, but also the classroom practices 
and pedagogic discourses and the way teachers cope 
with different pupils or different type of pupils, 
could impige on learning, to improve or to impede 
it, and consequently could contribute to social school 
inequalities production. This topic is the central one 
in our researches12 and I would try to summarize 
our main results about it.13 First indings are that 
pupils who are the less acquainted with school habits 
and requisites, because of their family socialisation, 
have a lot of dificulties in coping with classroom 
speciic multimodality and in relating judiciously 
tasks, material artefacts, language practices and 
discourses, and knowledge or conceptual contents. 
These pupils, who are more often than not pupils 
from desadvantaged social background, are often 
mistaken about the right way to interpret school 
situations, tasks and requisites and about the sort of 
dialogue or language practices needed to learn and to 
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elaborate their thought moreover. So one of the most 
recurrent misunderstundings we observe is the one 
which leads many pupils – lower classes pupils more 
than middle classes ones, boys more than girls – to 
consider learning as a succession of fragmentary 
tasks or exercises, of concrete procedures or routines 
to carry out, without being able to relate these ones 
with the general principles of specific knowledge 
ields, even in inchoate way. These pupils do not 
perceive the knowledge and learning questions and 
stakes, beyond the contexts, the tasks, the rituals or 
the behaviour rules of classroom. So they focused on 
performance, on answers they think teacher expects 
from them, more than on the cognitive treatment 
of the tasks. As Piaget would say,14 they attempt to 
succeed more than to understand what is necessary 
to succeed. Therefore they cannot recognize (identify 
and consider as worthwhile) any speciicity or any 
unity to academic subjects like mathematics or 
grammar, and each task is perpetually new, each task 
erases the former one. When interviewed about their 
school activities or about what occurs in classroom, 
they can tell factual events and describe what they 
did, they can say what about they spoke, but they 
seldom consider what they were supposed to learn 
or how to learn. These pupils can seldom control by 
themselves their cognitive functionning and depend 
very often on an external control or judgement. 
More generally, they are very dependent on adult's 
activity and person and they often confuse the level 
of the rules needed to live together in classroom (the 
regulative or horizontal discourse, in bernsteinian 
words) or the register of ordinary experience 
or exchanges with the level of the rules and the 
specific point of view needed to learn a specific 
subject (the instructional or vertical discourse in 
bernsteinian words). Then, they are pupils whose 
talk and dialogue practices are more often off-topic, 
unproductively disputational and uneficient to learn 
and think otherwise than they did before dialogue or 
task carrying out.
Then it’s clear that all pupils – and pupils from 
different social and cultural backgrounds – are not 
equally prepared to interpret and decipher school 
habits and requisites. But the problem of school 
inequalities does not limit to that. The problem lies 
also in the fact that teachers are unequally conscious 
of this question and that their ways to cope with what 
they perceive about their pupils’ characteristics and 
dificulties may conirm or increase these dificulties 
and school inequalities. Let us give some examples 
of these processes, all quoted from our researches 
(Rochex & Crinon, 2011). In a period where prevails 
a constructivist vulgate which prescribes that pupils 
must be “active,” sometimes regardless the cognitive 
nature of their activity, the priviledge given to 
activity means too often that teachers focus on 
tasks and problem solving, on pupils right or wrong 
answers or realization, to the detriment of concepts, 
of knowledge stakes beyond the tasks. Then these 
stakes could remain implicit or opaque for pupils 
who remain alone, without guidance or suficient 
one, to relate together differents tasks or these tasks 
to decontextualised knowledge contents and ways of 
thinking which allow them to be prepared to future 
more dificult tasks and situations. 
Many efforts are done by teachers to propose 
attractive, motivating or “familiar” situations and 
tasks to their pupils, especially when they belong to 
desadvantaged social backgrounds. But, even if these 
efforts are fruitful to engage pupils in tasks, they are 
most of times unsuficient to allow or to help them to 
recognise what they are supposed to learn in carrying 
tasks out, and teachers are not always conscious of 
the necessity to pay as much attention and efforts to 
this question than to the irst one. The worst is that, 
sometimes, the efforts to make tasks or situations 
attractive or genuine (that means very often not 
articial and not academic) could blur the nature and 
the aims of the task. For instance, we have observed 
in a primary school a session when the teacher aimed 
to make her pupils work on mathematics, especially 
on percentages. This session took place just one day 
after a national polling. So that the teacher thought 
it could be a good idea to propose to her pupils to 
make computations – to transform the numbers 
of different votes in percents and return – with 
this polling’s results. Of course, as a middle class 
member, she knew very well what is a polling and 
how to read its results. But pupils did not, because 
their parents, as working class or unemployed 
people, are often abstaining. Then the session, which 
was designed as a mathematics one, shifted very 
quickly to civic instruction lesson, and the initial 
aims disappeared soon behind civic informations (or, 
for a part, moral and political reproaches adressed 
to parents via their children) and pupils’ “political 
opinions” confrontation, without any debate being 
possible. This kind of blurring of the nature and the 
aims of activity – whose we could give many other 
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examples – is linked with and strenghtened by the 
focus put on tasks and situations rather than on their 
learning stakes, on pupils' busying rather than on 
teaching. 
It goes very often together with another blurring 
regarding language practices and genres of discourse. 
Our indings show that teachers could make narrowed 
uses of language, especially towards low achievers or 
working class pupils. In teacher pedagogic discourse 
(or in interactions with pupils or with some of them), 
these teachers do not use or use rarely the “words of 
knowledge,” the formulations or the terms speciic to 
subject matters, or the meta-linguistic interventions, 
re-formulations, corrections or resumptions which 
could allow pupils to generalize, to decontextualize 
or to depersonalize such answer or such way of 
doing. So they do not allow pupils to embed and 
to root what they work, the task or the problem 
they solve, the answer they give, in a conceptual 
coherence and continuity. Verbs and nouns which 
name intellectual operations or relevant properties 
are rarely used for the beneit of usual words and 
ordinary experience language. The teacher says for 
instance “look if it’s the same” rather than “compare”; 
he/she does not use the words angles, right angles or 
sides, but peaks, corners and edges, and then narrows 
the understanding of the components and properties 
of geometric igures to the perception or – at best – to 
the description of the wooden pieces of puzzle he/she 
used during the lesson. In the same way, norms and 
requirements to judge the relevance of an answer or 
a way of doing could be formulated mainly regarding 
formal or behavioral criteria or regarding agreement 
or disagreement with peers, regardless of explicit and 
developed references to speciic criteria of reasoning, 
argumentation or “proofs debate” in mathématics, 
grammar, technology or history. 
We are far from reasoned dialogue or exploratory 
talk described and defended by Mercer. As I said 
already, our indings allow us to think, like other 
researchers,15 that these practices, these narrowed 
pedagogy and discourses are more frequent 
when teachers adressed to lower class or low 
achievers pupils. And we could observe, in the 
same classrooms, what we called, after Schubauer-
Leoni (1988), differential didactic contracts, that is 
recurrent interaction formats between teacher and 
pupils, which are different from one kind of pupils 
to another, and which narrow roughly intellectual 
work proposed to lower calls or low achievers pupils 
and possible for them. The differentiation of the tasks 
proposed to different kind of pupils, of the framing 
of their activity, of the discourse and interaction 
adressed to them, leads thus to differentiate the 
universes of knowledge proposed to different kinds 
of pupils and those they can use of, and then to create 
not only different but unequal ways of working, 
possibilities of learning and cognitive beneits.
WHAT DO WE MEAN WHEN WE SAY SOCIAL?
These findings must led us to consider that 
pupils' or teachers' practices and discourses are not 
only shaped by what occurs in classroom space and 
time, but are also shaped by their out-of-school 
experience and social relationship, in other words 
(Bourdieu's ones) by their social habitus. Then I 
think we must ask what we mean when we say that 
classroom situations and practices are social ones, 
or when we speak about the social nature of human 
cognition. In order to understand, and eventually to 
transform, classroom situations and practices (like 
other ones), I argue it's necessary to link the three 
different meanings of the word social. First, this 
word refers to interactions between different persons, 
in situation time and space, as in most researches 
about socio-cognitive conlict or about pedagogical 
processes. Second, this word refers to the socio-
historical framing of school processes, which are 
both embedded or rooted in school and language 
as institutions16 and in subjects as socio-historical 
constructs but also as epistemological or cultural 
specific registers and communities of practices 
and of discourses. This second meaning refers to 
what Vygostki – who could not be considered as 
an interactionist psychologist like did a lot of his 
followers or commentators – called cultural and 
psychological tools, to the knowledge and thinking 
contents and tools which constitute mankind's 
and societies' external social memory and mental 
equipment; didacticians and historians of school 
are speciically interested by it. These two meanings 
and registers of study are foregrounded in Vygotski' 
works. The third meaning, crucial for sociologists, 
refers to the fact that each society is structured by 
social relations and conlicts and devided between 
different social milieus which differ more or less 
regarding ways of thinking and social habitus. As 
Bernstein (1993) remarked, it remains vague in 
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Vygotski's works – likely because of the teologic 
conception of history of the Russian revolution 
time – and also in Mercer's paper. Nevertheless I 
think it's as important as the two other ones to study 
and to understand what happens in classroom and 
to consider what happens in classroom is not totally 
build and structured in classroom space and time. 
It is clear for me that the social brain concept or 
hypothesis is only able to account of the condition 
of possibilty of the irst meaning of the word social 
but is unable to account of the two other ones.
NOTES
1. Regarding these questions, see Ambroise et Chauviré, 
2013.
2. “À partir de l’homo sapiens, la constitution d’un appa-
reillage de la mémoire sociale domine tous les problèmes 
de l’évolution humaine. […] Toute l’évolution humaine 
concourt à placer en dehors de l’homme ce qui, dans le 
reste du monde animal, répond à l’adaptation spéciique”, 
et donc à “la substitution progressive de la mémoire sociale 
au dispositif biologique de l’instinct” (Leroi-Gourhan, 
1965, pp. 24 and 34).
3. Regarding these questions, see Bruner, 1990 or 
Tomasello, 1999.
4. “Pour découvrir les sources de la pensée, il faut sortir 
des limites de l’organisme, et ce non dans la sphère intime 
de l’esprit mais dans les formes objectives de la vie sociale. 
Il faut rechercher les sources de la conscience et de la 
liberté humaines dans l’histoire sociale de l’humanité. Pour 
trouver l’âme, il faut la perdre.”
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